


# Efficient, Oblivious Data Structures for MPC

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
# Secure Multi-Party Computation



Goal: compute  $f(a, b, c, d)$

# Example application

## Privacy-preserving shortest path algorithm



Start/destination remain **private** to server holding map.

# Secret sharing-based MPC

## Additive secret sharing:

$[x]$ :  $P_i$  holds  $x_i$  (no information on  $x$ )

$$x = x_1 + \dots + x_n \in \mathbb{F}$$

Need all  $n$  shares to reconstruct secret.

## Arithmetic Black Box:

- ▶ **Add**( $[x], [y]$ ): output  $[x + y]$  (local operation)
- ▶ **Mul**( $[x], c$ ): output  $[c \cdot x]$  (local operation)
- ▶ **Mul**( $[x], [y]$ ): output  $[x \cdot y]$  (send  $O(1)$   $\mathbb{F}$ -element)
- ▶ **Reveal**( $[x]$ ): output  $x$  (send  $O(1)$   $\mathbb{F}$ -element)

Cost metric:  $|\text{comms}| + \text{local comp.}$

# Beyond circuits

ABB gives evaluation of [arithmetic circuits](#) or [binary circuits](#).

Most programs aren't written as circuits:

- ▶ How about [array lookup](#) with secret shared index?
- ▶ Dijkstra's algorithm?
- ▶ RAM programs?



## Results overview

Obliv. data structure	Based on	Complexity
Array	Demux [LDDA12]	$O(N)$
Dictionary	{ $N$ comparison circuits 'Binary search' circuit	$O(N \cdot \ell)$ $O(N + \ell \cdot \log N)$
Array	{ SCSL ORAM Path ORAM	$O(\log^4 N)$ $O(\log^3 N)$
Priority queue	{ Array Modified Path ORAM	$O(\log^4 N)$ $O(\log^3 N)$

$N$ : # items

$\ell$ : length of keys (for dict.)

# Simple Oblivious Array/Dictionary

Compute  $N$  comparisons:

$$[c_0] = ([i] \stackrel{?}{=} 0), [c_1] = ([i] \stackrel{?}{=} 1), \dots, [c_{N-1}] = ([i] \stackrel{?}{=} N - 1)$$


$$x_{[i]} = \sum_j [c_j] \cdot [x_j]$$

Comparison cost:  $O(\ell)$  comms/computation (constant round)

Total:  $O(N \cdot \ell)$



# Oblivious RAM




**Goal:** hide *access pattern*  $(i, j)$  from server.

Access pattern must be **randomized**,  $\text{polylog}(N)$  overhead

[Gol90, GO97]



# Oblivious array using ORAM



- ▶ Replace **encryption** with **secret sharing** (c.f. [DMN11])
- ▶ Execute instructions client/server within MPC
- ▶ **Reveal** client's address queries – secure by ORAM simulation


Related: client-server model using Yao [GKK+12, AHMR14]

# Oblivious array using ORAM

**Challenge:** design MPC circuit for ORAM instructions



# Tree-based ORAM



Index	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>
Leaf	3	4	0	6


**Invariant:**  $x$  lies on path from root to  $\text{Leaf}(x)$

Each node is **bucket** of fixed size  $Z = 2$

# Path ORAM eviction

Choose random leaf

Push entries as far down path as possible




Index	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>i</i>
Leaf	3	2	0	6	1	3	5	2	5

# Path ORAM eviction

Choose random leaf

Push entries as far down path as possible



Index	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>i</i>
Leaf	3	2	0	6	1	3	5	2	5



# Path Eviction in MPC

Eviction leaf:  $l^*$

Entry in path: leaf  $l$

Calculate **level** entry ends up at:

- ▶ **Least Common Ancestor** of  $l, l^*$ 
  - ▶ First bit where  $l, l^*$  differ
  - ▶  $\equiv$  first 1 in  $\text{BitDec}(l \oplus l^*)$
- ▶ Adjust LCA to account for bucket overflows

$O(\log N)$  comp. per entry, for path + stash size  $O(\log N)$


$$\Rightarrow O(\log^2 N)$$

Now need to **assign levels** (more complex)

# Path eviction in MPC

$([E_1], [\text{lev}_1]) \quad ([E_2], [\text{lev}_2]) \quad \dots \quad ([E_n], [\text{lev}_n])$

First idea: oblivious shuffle with permutation networks




$([E_{\pi(1)}], [\text{lev}_{\pi(1)}]) \quad ([E_{\pi(2)}], [\text{lev}_{\pi(2)}]) \quad \dots \quad ([E_{\pi(n)}], [\text{lev}_{\pi(n)}])$

Reveal  $\text{lev}_{\pi(i)}$  and place entry  $[E_i]$  in bucket

# Path eviction in MPC

$([E_1], [\text{lev}_1]) \quad ([E_2], [\text{lev}_2]) \quad \dots \quad ([E_n], [\text{lev}_n])$

First idea: oblivious shuffle with permutation networks



$([E_{\pi(1)}], [\text{lev}_{\pi(1)}]) \quad ([E_{\pi(2)}], [\text{lev}_{\pi(2)}]) \quad \dots \quad ([E_{\pi(n)}], [\text{lev}_{\pi(n)}])$

Reveal  $\text{lev}_{\pi(i)}$  and place entry  $[E_i]$  in bucket

Problem: some entries may be empty (dummy)


- ▶ If  $E_j$  is empty then  $\text{lev}_j = \perp$
- ▶ Reveals # of empty entries

Solution: requires oblivious sorting –  $O(\log N \log \log^2 N)$

# Oblivious Array from Path ORAM: summary

Single eviction cost:  $O(\log^2 N)$  comms/comp,  $O(\log N)$  rounds

Read/write cost:  $O(\log N)$

  $\times O(\log N)$  levels recursion

Total cost:  $O(\log^3 N)$

**In practice:** approx. 30% LCA comp, 30% sorting, 30% shuffling













# Conclusion

Oblivious data structures in MPC are **practical**.

Open problems:

- ▶ More data structures; RAM programs
- ▶ Better ORAM for MPC? Circuit ORAM [WCS14]

Thanks for listening!